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NOTES
Assuming the "surreptitious" character of the interrogation, the
soundness of the Massiah decision, on its facts, is probably beyond
question. Judicial condemnation of surreptitious interrogations seems
justified due to the latent dangers therein. However, it seems indis-
putable that Massiah is not the ultimate application of the sixth
amendment and that such an application may be imminent,"2 a fact
equally as portentous for state judiciaries and law enforcement
agencies as for the federal counterparts."a
Frank W. Hill
Multiple Corporations - Exclusive Business Locations-
Real Estate Developments
A major concern of community planners is to provide the rapidly
expanding suburban residential areas with adequate community center
facilities.' For this reason, plans for new developments now include
provisions for schools, churches, parks and shopping centers The
developers of these integrated areas ordinarily carry on their activities
through multiple corporations to obtain certain economic advantages.
The tenants in the shopping center area of the projects customarily
require restrictive covenants in their leases to insure exclusive busi-
ness locations. Both multiple incorporation and restrictive covenants
are economically desirable to the parties concerned, but under the
federal income tax laws and the Texas antitrust law careful planning
is required in order to achieve both results in a single project.
I. THE USE OF MULTIPLE CORPORATIONS
A. Organization
There are two basic patterns of multiple incorporation which are
available for development projects-horizontal and vertical.' In a
horizontal pattern the tract to be developed is divided into sections,
and a separate corporation is established to conduct the entire de-
announced . . . they are not controlling." Id. at 492. (Emphasis added.) It seems that the
Court has left the door open to overruling Crooker in the near future.
32 See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
" See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), noted in 18 Sw. L.J. 284 (1964).
' Haskell, Shopping Center as the "Nucleus," Architectural Forum, June 1963, p. 142.
'See Kroger Co. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 380 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)
error ref. n.r.e.; Casey, Real Estate Desk Book 233 (1961).3 Driscoll, Incorporating in Multi-Corporate Form, an Existing Business, N.Y.U. 16th
Inst. on Fed. Tax 243 (1958).
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velopment process on each section.4 In this type of organization each
individual corporation holds title to and controls the operations of
its particular section of the subdivision.! In a vertical arrangement,
the entire development process is one operation, and each corporation
performs a separate function for the integrated development! The
most common types of corporations used in a vertical pattern are
the construction corporation, the equipment-rental corporation, the
title-holding corporation, the sales corporation and the financing cor-
poration.'
B. Advantages Of Multiple Corporations
Multiple incorporation in real estate developments is a method used
by developers to obtain advantages not available to those operating
with other organizational forms. These advantages are usually con-
sidered in two categories (tax advantages and non-tax advantages),
but it should be borne in mind that in the area of real estate develop-
ments the two are inseparably intertwined.
1. Tax Advantages Although the Revenue Act of 1964' reduced
the attractions of using multiple corporations, certain advantages still
exist.' If a developer operates through several corporations he may
obtain tax benefits by (1) dividing income among several taxable
entities, (2) obtaining additional credits and exemptions and (3)
gaining preferential tax treatment (e.g., long-term captial gains as
opposed to ordinary income).s
The most important benefit is the allowance of an additional sur-
tax exemption for each corporation." Under the 1964 Act, each cor-
poration is taxed at only twenty-two per cent for the first $25,000 of
taxable income; above this amount, however, a surtax of twenty-six
per cent is added, making the total tax forty-eight per cent. The use
of multiple corporations provides more surtax exemptions, resulting
in greater tax savings. Even if the multiple corporate structure con-
stitutes a controlled group" and the taxpayer therefore is forced to
4 Id. at 258.
' Balter, Selected Tax Aspects of Residential Developments-From the Investor's Point
of View, 38 Taxes 683 (1960).
o ld at 693.
Ibid.
8 Revenue Act of 1964, S 121, 78 Stat. 19, amending Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 11.
'Maier, Use of Multiple Corporations Under the 1964 Revenue Act, 42 Taxes 565
(1964).
0 Convery, Residential Developments: Multiple Corporations, Allocations, Administra-
tion, N.Y.U. 14th Inst. on Fed. Tax 189 (1956). See notes 18-20 infra and accompanying
text.
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 11 (d).
"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 1563(a)(1) defines a parent-subsidiary controlled group
as one or more chains of corporations connected through stock ownership with a common
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pay a penalty tax of six per cent if he desires the additional exemp-
tions,'" a tax advantage still may exist.'"
Another advantage of using multiple corporations results from
the accumulated earnings credit of $100,000." This credit allows a
corporation to accumulate, free from the accumulated earnings tax,
$100,000 in overall earnings and profits regardless of the reason for
the accumulation." The accumulated earnings tax, however, is ap-
plied to accumulations above $100,000 if retained for some reason
other than the reasonable needs of the business.' In a real estate de-
velopment, if one corporation performed the entire operation it well
might accumulate much more than $100,000, causing the credit to
be of little value; multiple corporations, however, created for only
limited purposes, might each accumulate $100,000 during their exist-
ence, thereby making the credit very beneficial.
By completely liquidating a corporation after it has served its
purpose, it is possible under section 331 (a) (1) of the code" to secure
capital-gains treatment for realized" earnings and profits upon dis-
tributions to the shareholders. The use of multiple corporations makes
this provision especially advantageous. In a real estate development,
a building corporation, for example, may complete construction of
the homes long before they are all sold by the sales corporation. By
liquidating the construction corporation after it has fulfilled the pur-
pose for which it was created and has realized a substantial portion"°
parent, if the parent has eighty per cent of the voting power in the other corporations or
eighty per cent of the voting power is in one or more of the other corporations. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 1563(a) (2) defines a brother-sister controlled group as one in which
eighty per cent of two or more corporations is owned by any one individual, estate or
trust.
'3 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 1562(b).
14 In this situation, the controlled group has the option of dividing a single $25,000
surtax exemption or electing separate $25,000 exemptions at the cost of a 6% penalty
tax on the first $25,000 of taxable income. It is not favorable to elect the multiple surtax
exemptions if the total taxable income of the group not subject to surtax by the making
of the election is less than $32,000. CCH 51 Stand. Fed. Tax. Rep. 158 (1964). Above
this amount, however, tax savings will exist if the penalty tax is paid because it amounts
to $1,500 per year (6% of $25,000) while the additional surtax exemption is worth $6,500.
Maier, supra note 9, at 568.
"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 535(c).
"'Driscoll, supra note 3, at 245.
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 531 imposes a tax on the accumulated taxable income of
corporations which, under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 532, are formed for the purpose of
avoiding the income tax by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being
divided or distributed. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 533 provides that accumulation beyond
the reasonable needs of the business shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid the
income tax unless the corporation, by the preponderance of the evidence, shall prove to the
contrary.
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 331 (a) (1).
"The requirement of realization is very important to avoid having the corporation
treated as collapsible, under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 341, and having the income taxed
at ordinary rates. See Bittker, Federal Income, Estate and Gift Taxation 687 (3d ed. 1964).
" Corporations are taken out of collapsible status if a substantial part of the taxable
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of the taxable income, if any, to be derived from the construction of
the homes, the shareholders may obtain an early return on their in-
vestment at capital gains rates; whereas, if only one corporation were
conducting the entire operation, an attempt to obtain the same results
would involve a risk of having the distributions made upon partial
liquidation treated as dividends, 1 or else the shareholders must wait
for the completion of the whole project to receive their profits.
2. Non-Tax Advantages Multiple incorporation in real estate de-
velopments provides certain non-tax advantages, viz: limited liability,
investment flexibility, easier financing and more efficient manage-
ment. " A developer, by using multiple corporations, may be able to
contain liability within the various steps of the development process
or sections of the subdivision, thereby avoiding a general claim against
the entire project." The use of multiple corporations also may make
the development more attractive to investors by allowing them to
segregate their interests in various phases of the process or vary them
in several phases as desired to insure the greatest profits.' In addition,
the use of multiple entities may increase the over-all borrowing
capacity of the project because of the limitation of the risk of in-
dividual investors. The use of multiple corporations allows the man-
agement of the individual corporations to remain in closer contact
with the development operations of their companies. 6 This provides
for more rapid disposal of minor problems that may arise, and better
employer-employee relations. 7 Also, a separately identified employer
on each phase of the project simplifies the procedure for negotiating
with the various labor and craft unions.
.8
C. Dangers Of Multiple Corporations
A separate corporation, to be recognized as such for tax treatment,
must be a viable business entity; that is, it must have been formed
income to be derived from the property produced is realized. This probably means one
third or more. Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961); E. J. Zongker,
39 T.C. 1046 (1963). However, it has been held that "substantial part" refers to the
amount to be realized, and not to the amount already realized. Abbott v. Commissioner,
258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958); Rev. Rul. 62-12, 1962-1 Cum. Bull. 321. See generally
Bittker, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders 306 (1959).
" See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 316(a); Bittker, Federal Income, Estate and Gift
Taxation 647 (3d ed. 1964).
22Baiter, supra note 5, at 692; Convery, supra note 10 at 190.
2aConvery supra note 10, at 190.
24 Ibid.
25 Baiter, supra note 5, at 693.
26 The ultimate authority, however, will remain in the developer who will oversee and
coordinate the entire project.
27 Convery supra note 10, at 191.
2SSee Pre-Mixed Concrete, Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1601 (1962).
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for a substantial business purpose."9 Substantial business purpose is
synonymous with a non-tax advantage of multiple incorporation, and
for the courts to observe the distinctions of the corporate entities,
one of these business purposes or non-tax advantages must be the
principal reason for their use. The courts do not consider the reduc-
tion of taxes a valid business purpose.2 ' The non-tax advantages listed
above are important to a developer, but in tax cases involving sub-
divisions, the courts often declare tax avoidance to be the controlling
objective for the use of multiple corporations,32 and disregard the non-
tax reasons.33
If tax evasion is the suspected purpose for a developer's use of
multiple corporations, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has
available certain weapons with which he can attack the scheme.'
Section 61 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 codifies the basic
tax principle "that income is taxable to the one who earns it."3 The
Commissioner may use this section to tax the aggregate income of a
multiple corporate group to one corporation or individual if he finds
the corporate structure is a mere "sham" and that the corporation or
individual to which the tax is applied actually performed all of the
activities and assumed all of the risks." Section 482 of the Code" gives
the Commissioner the power to allocate income, deductions, credits
or allowances among commonly owned or controlled corporations to
prevent tax evasion or to reflect clearly the true taxable income " of
2 9 AIdon Homes, Inc., 33 T.C. 582 (1959). Whether or not a particular business pur-
pose is to be considered a substantial business purpose by the tax authorities and the courts
is a question of fact in each case and not one of law. Sno-Frost Inc., 31 T.C. 1058 (1959).
"0 See Turner-Moore No. 22 v. United States, 60-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9675 (W.D. Tex.
1960); Pre-Mixed Concrete, Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1601 (1962).
31 National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949); National Investor's
Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944); Aldon Homes, Inc., 33 T.C. 582 (1959).
32 But see notes 45-48 infra and accompanying text.
3 In Aldon Homes, Inc., 33 T.C. 582 (1959), the court stated that the existence
of liability insurance and workmen's compensation laws negatived limited liability as a
substantial business purpose. In Shaw Construction Co. v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 316
(9th Cir. 1963), the court refused to consider the facilitation of handling mechanics liens
as a valid reason for using multiple corporations. See also James Realty Co. v. United
States, 280 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1960); Kessmar Construction Co., 39 T.C. 778 (1963).
34 Bittker, Federal Income, Estate and Gift Taxation 427 (3d ed. 1964).
"STeschner v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 1003, 1005 (1962).
36In Shaw Construction Co. v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1963), the court
stated: "Whether the multiple corporations were unreal shams, serving no real business pur-
pose and earning no income . . .are issues of fact." Id. at 321. In deciding the fact issues
the court looks to whether or not the paper corporations actually performed the tasks alleged,
and were entitled to the income attributed to them.
3 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 482. "The purpose of said statute is to prevent the evasion
of taxes by the shifting of profits, the making of fictitious sales, and other methods cus-
tomarily used to 'milk' a taxable entity." Hamburger's York Road, Inc., 41 T.C. 821,
833 (1964).
" True taxable income is that which the taxpayer would have received had he dealt
with the other corporations at arm's length. Maier, supra note 9, at 576.
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each corporation. The Commissioner exercises broad discretion in
applying this section, and his decision will be sustained unless the
taxpayer establishes that the Commissioner has abused his discretion."
Under sections 269 and 155 1,40 the Commissioner is given the power
to deny exemptions and credits to a taxpayer who, under section 269,
has acquired a corporation for the principal purpose 1 of tax avoid-
ance," or who has, under section 1551, transferred property (other
than money) to a corporation which was previously inactive or was
created to receive the property ' unless the transferee corporation
establishes by the clear preponderance of the evidence that securing
of exemptions was not a major purpose of the transfer."
In the cases where the taxpayer has successfully defended his opera-
tion of a business through multiple corporations, the non-tax ad-
vantages for the divisions have been fortified by geographical or
functional separations among the corporations. " However, the geo-
"SHamburger's York Road, Inc., 41 T.C. 821 (1964).
40 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 269, 1551.
" "Principal purpose is the primary single most important purpose, not merely one of
several purposes." Golden, Multiple Incorporation and Multiple Surtax Exemptions, 26 Ga.
B.J. 385, 388 (1964).
,2nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 269 was designed to combat the acquisition of dormant
corporations that had suffered a series of business losses. The loss carryforward of such
"loss" corporations was utilized by transferring a profitable enterprise to a "loss" corporation
or by merging a loss cor-oration with a profitable corporation. In 1954, Congress attempted
to fortify section 269 by enacting Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 382(a) and (b) which reduce
the loss carryover when there is a change of ownership of a corporation, or a corporate re-
organization with the original shareholders acquiring less than 209 of the resulting corpora-
tion. Bittker, Federal Income, Estate and Gift Taxation 428 (3d ed. 1964).
4"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1551 could be used to deny a developer a surtax exemption
or an accumulated earnings credit if he should, for example, activate a previously existing
but dormant corporation or create a new corporation and transfer construction equipment
to the activated or newly created corporation if obtaining such exemptions or credits was a
major reason for the develoner's actions.
4Esrenco Truck Co., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 287 (1963); Pre-Mixed Concrete, Inc.,
21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1601 (1962).
" Geographical Separations: In Stater Bros., Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 780 (1962),
the formation of a separate corporation for each supermarket owned by taxpayers in different
localities was upheld. The reasons stated for the use of multiple corporations were to limit
the personal liability of the taxpayers and to preserve the concept of each market venture
as a separate entity. In Turner-Moore No. 22 v. United States, 60-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9675 (W.D. Tex. 1960), the use of a separate corporation for each of twenty-four service
stations located in different areas operated by taxpayers was allowed with the principle pur-
poses for the formation of the multiple corporations being to limit present and future
personal liabilities of the taxpayers, to protect the assets of each corporation from the
liabilities of the other corporations and to protect the businesses against possible losses in
gasoline price wars.
Functional Separations: In Esrenco Truck Co., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 287 (1963), the
taxpayer was permitted to separate his trucking operation from his principal business of
rendering dead poultry into meal and fats to immunize the trucking operation from possible
liability of the rendering company resulting from the sale of contaminated products.
In Pre-Mixed Concrete, Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1601 (1962), it was held that the
separation of the manufacturing function from the sales and delivery function was sup-
ported by a valid business purpose, viz., to guard against union attempts to organize the
trucking operation and to prevent a strike in one operation from causing taxpayer to
cease production completely.
graphical division apparently would not be applicable to real estate
developments because the distances separating the corporations in the
cases upholding this method of multiple incorporation have been
much greater than would be possible in a single real estate sub-
division.' Thus, functional separation seems to be the only practical
justification for multiple incorporation in real estate developments
that will be acceptable to the Revenue Service. If (1) each corpora-
tion performs a substantially different function (e.g., the divisions
are made along traditional business lines such as the separation of a
construction corporation from a sales corporation), (2) each cor-
poration is an independent income producing entity and (3) each
corporation deals with the others at arm's length, multiple incorpora-
47tion in a real estate development might be allowed for tax purposes,
provided that the taxpayer himself observes the corporate formalities
and the integrity of the functional separations."'
D. Disadvantages Of Multiple Corporations
Multiple incorporation, however, is not without disadvantages. Ad-
ministrative complications of observing corporate separations and
additional bookkeeping and accounting procedures tend to increase
the costs of operation." From a tax standpoint, the inability to set
the losses of one corporation off against the gains of another lessens
the desirability of using multiple corporations." Also, if the Com-
missioner should successfully attack a multiple corporate set-up, the
effects might be much worse than if the developer had adopted some
other form of organization in the beginning. There could be costs of
reorganization, and additional surtaxes and penalties which might
have been avoided had there been proper tax planning. Most de-
velopers believe, however, that these disadvantages are far outweighed
by the advantages and are willing to suffer them to obtain the bene-
fits available for using multiple corporations in real estate develop-
ments.Y
II. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN SHOPPING CENTER LEASES
The use of restrictive covenants in shopping center leases has be-
46See Stater Bros., Inc., supra note 45; Turner-Moore No. 22 v. United States, supra
note 45. See also Concord Supply Corp. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 919 (1962), in which
separate incorporation of adjoining warehouses was disallowed.
47 Casey, op. cit. supra note 2, at 254.
4 "[B]e sure that each corporation keeps separate records and, if possible, separate
personnel, in order to show that they are operating independently and are not diverting
income to each other." Casey, op. cit. supra note 2, at 254.
' Driscoll, supra note 3, at 253.
'
0 id. at 254.
" Maier, supra note 9, at $68.
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come increasingly popular with the development of integrated resi-
dential and business communities." A controlled business area pro-
vides numerous advantages for both the lessor and the lessee. To the
lessor, a properly restricted area can mean higher rentals, long term
leases and a better class of tenant.s To the lessee, an exclusive location
provides lessened competition and a corresponding increase in profits.
The main interest of a developer in an integrated development is the
sale of homes in the residential area. To make this product more
attractive, the developer is desirous of obtaining well-recognized busi-
nesses for the shopping center facilities. Restrictive covenants will
provide these mutual benefits, but, in Texas, there are serious prob-
lems encountered in attempting to obtain them.
III. ANTITRUST LAW AND RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
In Kroger Co. v. J. Weingarten, Inc.," Frank Sharp, a real estate
developer, organized two corporations on a horizontal basis to de-
velop Oak Forest Addition to the City of Houston, Texas. One of
the corporations was created to develop a shopping center tract, and
the other primarily to develop the residential portions of the addition.
Sharp wholly owned the shopping center corporation, but the other
was held in two irrevocable trusts for Sharp's daughters. The trust
corporation leased to Weingarten a tract of land upon which Wein-
garten built a supermarket. The lease contained covenants restricting
the trust corporation from leasing or selling, for purposes similar to
Weingarten's, any land owned or later to be acquired5 by it within
a prescribed area," for the duration of the lease. A memorandum of
the lease and a separate restrictive agreement were filed for record.
The separate agreement was signed by Sharp and the two corpora-
tions, and restricted all of the land then owned or later to be acquired
by any of the three within the area restricted by the lease. Subse-
quently, Kroger obtained land within the area from the trust cor-
poration and made plans to construct a competing supermarket.
Weingarten brought this suit to enforce the covenants and to restrain
Kroger from carrying out its plans to build. The court held that the
2 Note, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 940 (1959).
"3South Buffalo Stores, Inc. v. M.T. Grant Co., 153 Misc. 76, 274 N.Y. Supp. 549
(Sup. Ct. 1934).
54 380 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) error ref. n.r.e.
as If land is validly restricted, the restrictons will extend to land later acquired by the
covenantor, if such is part of the agreement. Gordon v. Hoencke, 253 S.W. 629 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1923).
" The area restricted was a circle with a radius of two miles extending from the center
of the Weingarten tract. It was estimated at the trial that the circle covered approximately
thirteen square miles and contained 40,000 people.
[Vol. 19
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restrictive covenants contained in the three instruments were part of
the same agreement to place restrictions upon the land in the pre-
scribed area. This constituted a restraint upon competition violating
the antitrust law of Texas, and rendered the entire agreement void
and unenforceable.
It is recognized that parties are entitled to a degree of freedom in
contracting to protect their own economic interests.' At common
law, covenants restricting competition are upheld unless they com-
prise unreasonable restraint. "s The test used in determining the reason-
ableness of a given set of restrictions consists of weighing the protec-
tion required by the lessee against the harm to the public which might
result from excessive restrictions. 9 Under federal law, restrictive
agreements are allowed unless they substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly."0 In Texas, the antitrust law prohibits all
agreements in restraint of competition. "' The courts, however, have
engrafted exceptions upon this rule which allow restraint in certain
specific instances. 2 In the principal case, Weingarten sought to bring
"7Note, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 940 1959).
58 The rule allowing reasonable restraints upon trade is the common law rule. The
Missouri court of appeals in Angelica Jacket Co. v. Angelica, 98 S.W. 805, 811 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1906), in a quote from 2 High, Injunctions § 1167 (4th ed. 1905), stated: ". . . the
third, and what may be considered the existing state of the law, as deduced from the latest
English and American authorities, is that which recognizes and enforces covenants of this
nature, even though the restraint is general throughout an entire state or country, provided it
is founded upon a sufficient consideration and is not unreasonable in view of the nature and
extent of the business of the covenantee."
"
9 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Tri-States Theatre Corp., 126 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1942).
goClayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964). See Tampa Elec. Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293
(1949). "In determining whether there has been a substantial lessening of competition 'it is
not necessary to show the actual impact which a . . . contract has on competition, but . . .
it is sufficient if it possesses the potentiality to impede a substantial amount of competitive
activity.' " Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
"' Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7426 (1960):
A "trust" is a combination of capital, skill or acts by two or more persons,
firms, corporations or associations of persons, or either two or more of them
for either, any or all of the following reasons:
1. .*. . to create or carry out restrictions in the free pursuit of any busi-
ness authorized or permitted by the laws of this State.
2 . . .
3. To prevent or lessen competition in the . . . sale or purchase of mer-
chandise, produce, or commodities ...
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7437 (1960): "Any contract or agreement in violation of
any provision of this subdivision shall be absolutely void and not enforcible either in law
or in equity."
2 The exceptions to the antitrust law allowed by the Texas courts are: (1) when an
agent is restricted from dealing for himself or representing others, Welch v. Phelps &
Bigelow Windmill Co., 89 Tex. 653, 36 S.W. 71 (1896); (2) when, in the sale of a
business, the seller agrees not to compete with the purchaser of the business, Gates v.
Hooper, 90 Tex. 563, 39 S.W. 1079 (1897); Queen Insurance Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250,
24 S.W. 397 (1893); (3) when an exclusive right or privilege is granted upon the property
of the grantor, Ft. Worth & D.C. Ry. v. State, 99 Tex. 34, 87 S.W. 111 (1904); (4) when
a lessor restricts other land owned by him if the restrictions are incidental to a lawful
lease. Schnitzer v. Southwest Shoe Corp., 364 S.W. 373 (Tex. 1963); Celli & Del Papa
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the restrictive covenants within one of these exceptions, viz.: that a
person who has a property interest in land" may validly restrict other
land owned by him if such restrictions are incident to a lawful lease."
The court, however, refused to treat the lessor trust corporation as
the alter ego of Sharp, " and concluded, therefore, that since Sharp
had no property interest in the land leased, the agreement signed by
Sharp and the two corporations was in violation of the antitrust law
and did not qualify for the exception alleged."
In Schnitzer v. Southwest Shoe Corp.," the Texas Supreme Court
said: "Outside of the exceptional situations . . .we have rejected
appeals for a 'reasonable' relaxation of the anti-trust statutes."" The
Texas courts have consistently adhered to the doctrine that an agree-
ment in restraint of trade, if it does not fall within one of the special
exceptions, is invalid regardless of whether or not it is reasonable."9
This definitely is a harsh rule, and is contrary to both the common
law rule and the federal law allowing reasonable restraint."9
v. Galveston Brewing Co., 227 S.W. 941 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921). It should be noted
that a rule of reason is used in applying these exceptions. See Moody & Wallace, Texas
Antitrust Laws and Their Enforcement--Comparison With Federal Antitrust Laws, 11 Sw.
L.J. 1 (1957).
13 Cilli & Del Papa v. Galveston Brewing Co., 227 S.W. 941 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921),
states that the interest necessary to validly restrict land under this exception to the anti-
trust law is that of an owner, lessor or one who has control of the property to which the
restrictive agreement has reference.
64 Schnitzer v. Southwest Shoe Corp., 364 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1963); Celli & Del Papa
v. Galveston Brewing Co., 227 S.W. 941 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921).
S The court reasoned that, because the trusts were irrevocable, the trust corporation
was removed completely from Sharp's control. This holding appears justified even though
Sharp's bank was the trustee because the courts require only that the parties to a con-
spiracy are capable of competing with each other, not that they actually compete. See
Fairbanks-Morse & Co., 246 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref. n.r.e.; Padgitt
v. Lone Star Gas Co., 213 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). On rehearing the court
did hold that the wholly owned corporation was the alter ego of Sharp because he had
absolute control over it, but it refused to do the same for the trust corporation. Kroger
Co. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 380 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) error ref. n.r.e.
"The court also refused to sever the invalid separate agreement from the lease which
would have been valid if standing alone. The court concluded, however, that the two
instruments were pursuant to the same agreement and were thereby void under the terms
of Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7437 (1960), which renders agreements in violation of
the antitrust law absolutely void. See Patrizi v. McAninch, 153 Tex. 389, 269 S.W.2d
343 (1954); Wegner Bros. v. Biering & Co., 65 Tex. 506 (1886).
67 364 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1963). In this case, the supreme court, confronted with a
fact situation similar to that of the principal case, held that the alleged exception to the
antitrust law would be allowed only when the agreements "are collateral or incidental to
a lawful lease of the premises in which the lessor or grantor has a property interest." Id.
at 375.
'lid. at 375.
"Climatic Air Distrib. of South Texas v. Climatic Air Sales, Inc.; 162 Tex. 273, 345
S.W.2d 702 (1961); Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Houck, 88 Tex. 184, 30 S.W. 869
(1895); Grand Prize Distributing Co. v. Gulf Brewing Co., 267 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1954) error ref.
" See notes 58-60 suPra and accompanying text.
